The territory is not the territory: toward a responsible epistemology.

The territory is not the territory: toward a responsible epistemology. It soon becomes evident through a brief survey of the "Historyof Ideas The history of ideas is a field of research in history that deals with the expression, preservation, and change of human ideas over time. The history of ideas is a sister-discipline to, or a particular approach within, intellectual history. " that philosophical reflections pertaining per��tain?intr.v. per��tained, per��tain��ing, per��tains1. To have reference; relate: evidence that pertains to the accident.2. to language arebased on the recognition of two distinct domains, namely, the"world of things" (or the extensional world) and the"world of words or expressions about this 'world' ofthings'." (1) The former is what is usually labeled as'reality' and the latter 'language.' However, theacceptance of this truism has been a fertile ground for philosophicaldiscussions and debates that are registered throughout the "Historyof Ideas." One of the central concerns of these discussions anddebates has been the nature of the relation between these two'worlds.' The "Depictional View" A significant portion of Alfred Korzybski's writings and thoseof the upholders of general semantics gen��er��al semantics?n. (used with a sing. verb)A discipline developed by Alfred Korzybski that proposes to improve human behavioral responses through a more critical use of words and symbols. can be read as works that refute re��fute?tr.v. re��fut��ed, re��fut��ing, re��futes1. To prove to be false or erroneous; overthrow by argument or proof: refute testimony.2. or dissent from the commonly-accepted position that language depicts the"world of things." Let us call this view the depictional view.In this view, the relation of depiction or 'denotation' istaken to be the relation between the 'extensional' world andlanguage resulting in descriptions of the world which under normalcircumstances would be 'accurate' and 'complete.'(2) Advocates of this view hold that through the mediation of language,'things' are somehow contained in words. Adherents of thisdepictional view take language to be a tool to represent the world.Though the depictional view has various shades and varieties, advocatesand adherents to this position can be seen rampant throughout the"History of Ideas" since the pre-platonic era (3), but moreimportantly, this position, Korzybski argues, is what is upheld by themajority of language users. The depictional view hinges Hinges may refer to: Plural form of hinge, a mechanical device that connects two solid objects, allowing a rotation between them. Hinges, a commune of the Pas-de-Calais d��partement, in northern France upon the critical assumption thatlanguage merely verbalizes, or puts into a perceptible per��cep��ti��ble?adj.Capable of being perceived by the senses or the mind: perceptible sounds in the night.[Late Latin perceptibilis, from Latin perceptus form, theextensional world we experience by somehow 'capturing' ourexperiences and 'containing' them in 'signs' or'sounds' that are perceptible and accessible to our visual orauditory auditory/au��di��to��ry/ (aw��di-tor?e)1. aural or otic; pertaining to the ear.2. pertaining to hearing.au��di��to��ryadj. senses, thereby making communication possible. Language in thedepictional view plays the crucial role of packing'subjective' experiences of the 'objective'extensional world experienced by the individual and converting them into'objective' packets that can be then communicated throughlanguage. The depictional view can thus be seen as operating with theimplicit assumption that the 'subjective' experiences of this'objective' world are converted to the verbal or perceptiblelevel of expressions through signs and/or sounds by the mechanism oflanguage. This assumption, with which the advocates and adherents of thedepictional view operate, makes possible the 'objectivity' ofcommunication since the individual as language-user is kept at adistance with all his subjectivity. As language is taken to be anobjective tool of depiction, an individual merely uses the tool toperform the task of depiction with the performance of depicting beingset apart from the subjectivity of the performer (the experiencer andthe language-user) ensuring objectivity to the performance itself andthereby transferring this objectivity to the product, namely theexpression(s) of this experience in language. Korzybski's general semantics brings to our attention thispivotal assumption in the depictional view and takes issue with it.Korzybski highlights that the depictional view of the language-worldrelation is based on an assumption that overlooks an important fact: thestructural 'space' between the subjective experience of the'world of things' and the verbalization of this subjectiveexperience (assumed to result in a 'description' of theextensional world) is not immediate but rather punctuated and mediatedby two non-verbal levels. Namely, this experience is mediated by theindividual's nervous system and by his larger environment, or whatI refer to as the facticity fac��tic��i��ty?n.The quality or condition of being a fact: historical facticity.or situatedness of his experience, beforehis experience gets verbalized. The recognition of this fact--viewingthe individual not as an "experiencer" but, due to themediation of these two non-verbal levels, as rather an "expresserof experiences"--makes us reconsider the assumption that languagecan be taken at face-value to be a non-interpretative tool forobjectively depicting any experience of the extensional world. Korzybski's contribution to epistemology epistemology(ĭpĭs'təmŏl`əjē)[Gr.,=knowledge or science], the branch of philosophy that is directed toward theories of the sources, nature, and limits of knowledge. Since the 17th cent. is the introductionof the need to recognize these two interpolating non-verbal levels,namely: (a) the processes of our nervous systems, and (b) our facticity or situatedness, that we are 'beings'embedded Inserted into. See embedded system. in a historical time and culture with an unavoidable baggage ofbeliefs, biases, presumptions, cultural assumptions, etc. The recognition of these two non-verbal levels as integral to themechanism of the experiencer-expresser equation results diverges fromthe abstract notion of the neutral-epistemic-subject. Korzybski'sgeneral semantics replaces this notion with the subject"as-a-whole-in-an-environment, thereby including our neuro-semanticand neuro-linguistic environments as environment." (4) With the advent of neuro-cognitive sciences, Korzybski'sinsistence upon the importance of the mediating structure of my nervoussystem in what I experience and what I 'think' I haveexperienced has now become undeniable. It would be a truism in thepresent time to hold that my nervous system is a sense-data processingunit operative through modes of abstraction and projection. (5) Throughthe process of abstraction the received sense data (experiences fedthrough my sense organs Sense organA structure which is a receptor for external or internal stimulation. A sense organ is often referred to as a receptor organ. External stimuli affect the sensory structures which make up the general cutaneous surface of the body, the exteroceptive ) is processed using the belief systems of thelarger environment of my facticity in which I am embedded--my beliefs asfunction of my situatedness--and it is this processed product that isultimately projected in an expression of my experiences. The acknowledged role of the nervous system implies that theverbalization of my experiences must be something more than a meredepiction or simple description since I, as the subject, am not merely apassive describer as held in the depictional view, but rather I am anactive subject--an evaluator (6)--a processing unit as the subjectprocesses the sense data using my belief system. Therefore, what washitherto considered "pure description" and hence an objectivepicture projected by the object or the 'extensional' world, infact, turns out to be my projection of'how-things-are-and-what-things-are.' Korzybski claims that the neglect of, or indifference or ignorancetoward, these two interpolating levels has led us to mistakenly believethat words are depictive of the extensional world and that language canbe descriptive in relation to the extensional world. Dissolution of 'Is' Symbolically formulated, descriptions have the logical form x is y(where x is not equal toy, in which case it would be a proposition ofidentity rather than a description). Given this form, it becomes tautologous Tau`tol´o`gousa. 1. Repeating the same thing in different words; tautological. to say that 'all'descriptions are cases of predications or attributions of the predicate In programming, a statement that evaluates an expression and provides a true or false answer based on the condition of the data. y to the name x which stands for an object-thing-event in theextensional world. In the depictional view, this is (or the copula copula/cop��u��la/ (kop��u-lah)1. any connecting part or structure.2. a median ventral elevation on the embryonic tongue formed by union of the second pharyngeal arches and playing a role in tongue development. is) taken to be anindicator of an assertion of a "pure description" since thetransformation from the extensional world to the "world ofwords" is assumed to be direct and immediate. However, in light ofKorzybski's challenge to this assumption, and the insight of thetwo mediating non-verbal levels (my facticity-situatedness and mynervous system), the notion of the 'verbal' level being"purely descriptive" and objective becomes an unjustifiedassumption, uncritically accepted by the depictional view. Thestatements hitherto held pure and objective in fact turn out to be morethan a mere description since the subjectivity of the subject in termsof his/her facticity plays an essential role in the verbalization of theextensional world. The recognition of these two mediating levelstransforms the very nature of the copula is and its variant forms froman indicator of an assertion of an objective and pure description to anindicator of an assertion or expression of a subjective evaluationconducted, either consciously or unconsciously, through the media of thenervous-system and the facticity of the asserter or expresser. Thus wesee that words are not purely descriptive but are rather indicators ofevaluations, and that human beings as language-users are not meredescribers but evaluative interpreters, though the form of language maydisguise expressions of evaluation in the garb of agrammatically-descriptive form. The world of words or language is therefore not a descriptivemedium of communication and expression but a medium of evaluation. Itfollows that language can never "purely describe" or"depict" or "reflect" the extensional world. Thus,if I look at language as a 'map' depicting the 'world ofthings,' which is the territory being mapped, the map can never bethe territory since the map is an evaluative reflection of thesubjectivity of the map-maker himself. In a more poetic way, "thewords are not the things." The dissolution of the is as description results in the dissolutionof the notion of "qualities-in-the-object" as well, since thequality is not there in the object as supposed in the depictional view;my beliefs and nervous system abduct abduct/ab��duct/ (ab-dukt��) to draw away from the median plane, or (the digits) from the axial line of a limb.abdu��cent ab��ductv. , or imprint, an order upon myexperience. In other words Adv. 1. in other words - otherwise stated; "in other words, we are broke"put differently , unlike the depictional view where theextensional world imparts to me a world of descriptions, inKorzybski's general semantics my experience is abducted abductedDistal angulation of an extremity away from the midline of the body in a transverse plane and away from a sagittal plane passing through the proximal aspect of the foot or part, or away from some other specified reference point by mybelief system provided by my facticity-situatedness, resulting in anevaluation projected through my expressions and assertions--though theseexpressions are misleadingly clothed clothe?tr.v. clothed or clad , cloth��ing, clothes1. To put clothes on; dress.2. To provide clothes for.3. To cover as if with clothing. in the grammatical form of adescription. Thus while the depictional view holds the extensional worldas the provider of the content of my so-called-descriptions, Korzybskiupholds my subjectivity as an evaluative-abductor. Since under the depictional view, is reflects a description of theform x is y, the meaning of x is in terms of y. Hence meaning isimparted by virtue of definition, as amply highlighted in the Socraticmethod Socratic methodEducation A teaching philosophy that differs from the traditional format as instruction is in the form of problem-solving and testing of hypotheses. See Layer cake education, Spoon feeding. and instantiated in the Platonic dialogues. However, inKorzybski's framework, the is in the grammatically-descriptive formx isy reflects the interpolation interpolationIn mathematics, estimation of a value between two known data points. A simple example is calculating the mean (see mean, median, and mode) of two population counts made 10 years apart to estimate the population in the fifth year. of my nervous system as well asmyfacticity. What x means to me, then, is not via "meaning asdefinition" but rather as "meaningfulness to-me given mysituatedness-facticity in that threshold of space-time." That is to say that in all levels of verbalizations, the territorycan never be plotted objectively since no meaning is independent of thesubject. For Aristotelians, 'knowledge' pertaining to theextensional world consisted of making rational deductions and inferencesfrom "purely descriptive" factual expressions. For Korzybski,however, such 'knowledge' is a myth generated by thebewitchment be��witch��ment?n.1. a. The act of bewitching.b. The power to bewitch.c. The state of being bewitched.2. A bewitching spell.Noun 1. of what he labels elementalistic language; language by whichone can distinguish between elements constituting a whole that onecannot, in fact, separate in 'reality.' To ignoreKorzybski's caution against elementalistic evaluations would leadto what I term the "elementalistic fallacy fallacy,in logic, a term used to characterize an invalid argument. Strictly speaking, it refers only to the transition from a set of premises to a conclusion, and is distinguished from falsity, a value attributed to a single statement. "--a confusionarising by confusing separables-in-language with separables-in-reality.For example, elementalistic language allows me to talk about the"flavor" of the extract of a tealeaf independent of theextract of the tealeaf. I cannot, however, in fact separate or split thetwo in reality, since the extract of the tealeaf and what I call its"flavor" form an inseparable in��sep��a��ra��ble?adj.1. Impossible to separate or part: inseparable pieces of rock.2. Very closely associated; constant: inseparable companions. organic-whole ontologically on��to��log��i��cal?adj.1. Of or relating to ontology.2. Of or relating to essence or the nature of being.3. . Aristotle committed this fallacy since he assumed that"emotions" and "feelings" which are linguisticallydistinguishable from "thoughts" are, in fact, separable sep��a��ra��ble?adj.Possible to separate: separable sheets of paper.sep ontologically or in reality as well. Korzybski, on the other hand,rejects the possibility of such a separation; hence "rationalknowledge" without any shade of subjective feeling and"emotion" are the result of an elementalistic fallacy. Theinsistence upon "knowledge" being objective and not infusedwith subjective elements (such as "emotions" and"feelings") accounts for the elementalistic fallacy throughoutthe "History of Ideas." Korzybski argues that man, being anorganism-as-a-whole-in-a-current-environment, cannot be split into'thoughts' and 'feelings'; instead, he proposed thenon-elementalistic term semantic reaction to refer to the organic unityof thought-reactions-feelings which cannot be separated as either'rational' or 'emotional.' Thus Korzybski brings tolight a new brand of epistemology, which I term responsible epistemologyin which the subject plays a pivotal role and is responsible for theevaluative is in his grammatically-descriptive expressions. This is, however, distinct from the Kantian subject-centeredepistemology. Unlike Kant, Korzybski does not derive the subjectivity ofthe subject from transcendental conditions of a priori a prioriIn epistemology, knowledge that is independent of all particular experiences, as opposed to a posteriori (or empirical) knowledge, which derives from experience. forms ofperception and understanding. Rather, Korzybski bases the subjectivityof the subject on our facticity-situatedness and our neuro-cognitive andneuro-semantic states. Thus while the Kantian subjectivity is based onthe transcendental condition of 'knowledge,' Korzybskiansubjectivity is based on the existential ex��is��ten��tial?adj.1. Of, relating to, or dealing with existence.2. Based on experience; empirical.3. Of or as conceived by existentialism or existentialists: condition of the subject. Thuswhile the dismantling dis��man��tle?tr.v. dis��man��tled, dis��man��tling, dis��man��tles1. a. To take apart; disassemble; tear down.b. of qualities in Kant is only apparent, since thetranscendental a priori categories or forms of understanding rescues theobjectivity of predication In CPU instruction execution, executing all outcomes of a branch in parallel. When the correct branch is finally known, the results of the incorrect branch sequences are discarded. See branch prediction. through the universality of these forms,Korzybskian dissolution of predication and thereby of qualities iscomplete. Dissolution of 'Objects' Korzybski's general semantics proceeds further with thedeconstruction deconstruction,in linguistics, philosophy, and literary theory, the exposure and undermining of the metaphysical assumptions involved in systematic attempts to ground knowledge, especially in academic disciplines such as structuralism and semiotics. of the depictional view by deconstructing yet anotherassumption on which the depictional view is based; namely, the implicitbelief that a name (label, term, symbol, etc.) has a unique power topreserve and reproduce the experience of the object it names. Thus, thedepictional view assumes the is in demonstrative LEGACY, DEMONSTRATIVE. A demonstrative legacy is a bequest of a certain sum of money; intended for the legatee at all events, with a fund particularly referred to for its payment; so that if the estate be not the testator's property at his death, the legacy will not fail: but be payable expressions of the formit is ... this is ... he is ... she is ... that is, etc., to be animplicit indicator of a "frozen experience." That is to say,when I state that "this is Smith" or "this is atable," I am implicitly assuming that the is here is not an is ofmere predication but an is indicating identity or sameness in thepredicates being predicated--even though the object that is the sourceof my present experience may differ temporally or spatially. (7) Iimplicitly hold that when I say "this is Smith," the source ofexperience or the object I called "Smith" yesterday(Smit[h.sub.x]) is the same object that I am calling "Smith"today (Smit[h.sub.x+1]), or that the thing ([T.sub.1]) in front of mehere is same as the thing that I have at home that I call a"table" upon which I write ([T.sub.2]), when I say "thisis a table." Thus, the depictional view operates with the implicitassumption that Smit[h.sub.x] is identical to Smit[h.sub.x+1] or[T.sub.1] is identical to [T.sub.2], thus: (a) providing an object status to the entities called"Smith" and "table," and (b) 'freezing' the experience of the entities called"Smith" and "table," thereby binding my experienceof yesterday with my experience today, and my experience'here' with my experience 'there.' General semantics, following Korzybski, does not raise the voice ofdissent against this underlying assumption itself, for the act of'freezing' our experiences in language is inevitable and evennecessary for communication itself. To ban this 'freezing' ofexperiences would be foolhardy fool��har��dy?adj. fool��har��di��er, fool��har��di��estUnwisely bold or venturesome; rash. See Synonyms at reckless.[Middle English folhardi, from Old French fol hardi : since naming each experience of an objectwith a name would consequently overpopulate o��ver��pop��u��late?v. o��ver��pop��u��lat��ed, o��ver��pop��u��lat��ing, o��ver��pop��u��latesv.tr.To fill (an area, for example) with excessive population to the detriment of the inhabitants, resources, or environment. our "world ofwords" with names. In fact, Korzybski alleges that'freezing' experiences in space-time is the distinctivecharacteristic of man as a time-binder. In other words, it is the uniqueability of man that he can relate the experiences of the past with thethose in the present and carry them forward to the future. The disagreement with the depictional view is rather that it losessight of this fundamental assumption itself, and thereby holds that theobject itself is 'frozen' in time-space, consequentlyoverlooking the fact that it is the I--the subject--who has thiscapacity to freeze my experiences of objects and verbalize these frozenexperiences through names, labels, etc. The depictional view overlooksthis operative assumption when it ascribes the 'freezing'(which by necessity involves the active participation of theexperiencer) solely as a function of the 'the frozen.' Inother words, the depictional view, by overlooking this assumption,mistakes my "freezing of my experiences" as experiences offrozen sources themselves. Through this act of implicitly equatingfreezing with frozen, the depictional view grants me the legitimacy tospeak of objects in the extensional world using names in my expressionsthat denote de��note?tr.v. de��not��ed, de��not��ing, de��notes1. To mark; indicate: a frown that denoted increasing impatience.2. 'sameness' of the sources of these experiences.This implies that the depictional view implicitly assumes that myexperiences of these objects in the extensional world are in a sense"complete" since the sources of these experiences themselvesare frozen in space-time and that a name merely substitutes it whenthese experiences are verbalized. The notion of 'frozen' experiences has played a key rolein the domain of epistemology, though many have voiced objections to itin the "History of Ideas" since before Socrates. Objectionshave been unable to sustain themselves, however, because if knowledge isto be characterized by certainty, then the referent ref��er��ent?n.A person or thing to which a linguistic expression refers.Noun 1. referent - something referred to; the object of a reference of the name in theextensional world must be static and unchanging un��chang��ing?adj.Remaining the same; showing or undergoing no change: unchanging weather patterns; unchanging friendliness. too. An extensionalworld consisting of constantly changing referents would render any talkof certainty of experiences as impossible. This would result in theimpossibility ImpossibilitySee also Unattainability.belling the catmouse’s proposal for warning of cat’s approach; application fatal. [Gk. Lit. of assigning a definite truth-value to any assertionpertaining to the extensional world, and would render the whole notionof "Truth" a mythical myth��i��cal? also myth��icadj.1. Of or existing in myth: the mythical unicorn.2. Imaginary; fictitious.3. character. The depictional view salvagesthe notion of "Truth" by implicitly bestowing a'frozen' status to the extensional world, but it does this atthe cost of turning a blind eye to the very unique characteristic of manas a time-binder--a being bestowed with the capacity to'freeze,' store, reproduce, and pass on experiences. Korzybski's general semantics attempts to restore thecentrality of the role of the I as a subject in the very phenomenon of'freezing' experiences, thus further strengthening theframework for a new responsible epistemology. It is only through therecognition of this responsibility as a subject that I as anepistemic-linguistic-being can attain a state of epistemic-linguisticmaturity. The recognition and acceptance of responsible epistemologybased upon the centrality of the I, or the subject inepistemic-linguistic processes, Korzybski argues, would pave PAVECardiology A clinical trial–Post AV Node Ablation Evaluation the dawnfor the manhood MANHOOD. The ceremony of doing homage by the vassal to his lord was denominated homagium or manhood, by the feudists. The formula used was devenio vester homo, I become you Com. 54. See Homage. of humanity (7). The realization of the centrality of the subject as a being capableof 'freezing' experiences brings about the dissolution ofobjects as such. Logically speaking, therefore, the deconstruction ofthe grammatical form x is y is complete. The dissolution becomescomplete because not only is the is here subjective, as discussedearlier, but both x and y can no longer be taken as merely naming"frozen objects" in the extensional world. They are rathernames of processed-projections of the experiences that I have had andwhich I have frozen. In other words, names do not denote objects in theextensional world but rather my 'frozen experiences' of theseobjects (8). With the I or the subject moved to the center ofepistemic-linguistic structure, fallibility fal��li��ble?adj.1. Capable of making an error: Humans are only fallible.2. Tending or likely to be erroneous: fallible hypotheses. instead of certainty becomesthe prime characteristic of 'knowledge' pertaining to theextensional world. The characteristic of 'knowledge' asfallible fal��li��ble?adj.1. Capable of making an error: Humans are only fallible.2. Tending or likely to be erroneous: fallible hypotheses. is strengthened even more because an extensional world minusfrozen objects requires the acknowledgement that experiences are not'complete.' This insight can be scientifically strengthened bythe fact that as a finite being in terms of my perceptual organs, I amnot biologically able to experience the extensional world in its'objective' totality TOTALITY. The whole sum or quantity. 2. In making a tender, it is requisite that the totality of the sum due should be offered, together with the interest and costs. Vide Tender. . Scientifically speaking, objects havespectra of qualities which are imperceptible im��per��cep��ti��ble?adj.1. Impossible or difficult to perceive by the mind or senses: an imperceptible drop in temperature.2. to me as a biological beingdue to the fact of my empirical limitations. Thus the very source of myknowledge of the extensional world, namely my experiences, themselvesare 'incomplete', apart from the fact that they are ordered bymy nervous and belief systems. Consequently, I have no empirical scopefor accessing the extensional world per se. Therefore my'knowledge' pertaining to the extensional world cannot beattributed a strict either-or dichotomized notation of truth-value, butcan be assigned only degrees of 'truth.' The rejection of asystem of strict either-or dichotomy di��chot��o��my?n. pl. di��chot��o��mies1. Division into two usually contradictory parts or opinions: "the dichotomy of the one and the many"Louis Auchincloss. is a consequence of the fact thatthe only way an expression of an experience ([E.sub.1]) can be falsifiedor justified is through yet another experience ([E.sub.2]). But sinceexperience itself is never 'complete', therefore, [E.sub.2] isalso not 'complete' but can at best be regarded a greaterapproximation approximation/ap��prox��i��ma��tion/ (ah-prok?si-ma��shun)1. the act or process of bringing into proximity or apposition.2. a numerical value of limited accuracy. to 'truth' and not the discloser of'truth' itself. Thus not only are words not things, but the things that I take as'things' are not the things themselves. To put thismetaphorically, we could say that not only is it the case that the mapis not the territory, but also that the territory we map is never theterritory. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Notes 1. Kenneth G. Johnson, General Semantics: An Outline Survey, 3rdEdition. Institute of General Semantics The Institute of General Semantics is a not-for-profit corporation established in 1938 by Alfred Korzybski, located in Fort Worth, Texas. Its membership roles include members from 30 different countries. Inc. (2004), p.3. 2. The term 'normal' here implies that one is not lying,has no defects in his/her sense organs, is physically andpsychologically fit, is not joking, is not under any illusion, and isinvolved in a first person utterance. 3. This interesting task of enumerating the adherents and advocatesof the depictional view is not undertaken here since it would require aspace of its own, and could and will be taken up in an independentpaper. Furthermore, this historical survey would neither strengthen norweaken the main thrust of my paper, for I am not arguing for the noveltyof general semantics here but rather only explicating its theoreticalbasis and extending it. 4. Alfred Korzybski Noun 1. Alfred Korzybski - United States semanticist (born in Poland) (1879-1950)Alfred Habdank Skarbek Korzybski, Korzybski , "The Role of Language in the PerceptualProcess" from Perception: an Approach to Personality, edited byRobert R. Blake For other persons of the same name, see Robert Blake.Dr. Robert R. Blake (January 21, 1918 – June 20, 2004) was an American management theoretician. He did pioneer the field of organizational dynamics. and Glenn V. Ramsey. The Ronald Press Company: New York New York, state, United StatesNew York,Middle Atlantic state of the United States. It is bordered by Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and the Atlantic Ocean (E), New Jersey and Pennsylvania (S), Lakes Erie and Ontario and the Canadian province of (1951). Reprinted in Alfred Korzybski: Collected Writings 1920-1950,edited by M. Kendig, Institute of General Semantics, Inc. (1990) 5. To quote, "mechanisms of perceptions lie in the ability ofour nervous system to abstract and to project." Ibid., p.686. 6. To quote, "Abstracting by necessity involves evaluating,whether conscious or not ..." Ibid., p.686. 7. It must be noted that some thinkers like Hume do not hold thenotion of 'sameness' as being synonymous with synonymous withadjective equivalent to, the same as, identical to, similar to, identified with, equal to, tantamount to, interchangeable with, one and the same as the notion of'identity' and relate the former with the notion of'unity'. We, however, ignore this Humean distinction heresince Hume holds this distinction to conclude that the notion of an'unchanging' object is 'fiction'; a conclusionsimilar to Korzybski's. See Treatise A scholarly legal publication containing all the law relating to a particular area, such as Criminal Law or Land-Use Control.Lawyers commonly use treatises in order to review the law and update their knowledge of pertinent case decisions and statutes. of Human Nature, edited bySelby-Bigge, 2nd edition, rev. P.F. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press,1985, p.200. 8. Korzybski's first major work, Manhood of Humanity, is basedon this thematic exploration. 9. Korzybski suggests remedial methods such as'indexing,' 'dating,' etc., in linguistic practicesto generate awareness of the implicit subject's act of'freezing' experiences via 'names.' This method,which constitutes the method of E-Prime, must however, be distinguishedfrom the 'Ideal-language' thesis of the Analytic philosopherslike Russell and Frege. Unlike the latter, general semantics does notdeclare that an ideal or a logical language will be any better than ourordinary language and holds that the real solution lies in adopting'responsible epistemology' and bring to the awareness of humanbeings that the subject is the centre of any'epistemic-linguistic' structure. PRAVESH JUNG GOLAY* *Pravesh Jung Golay received his Ph. D. in Philosophy from theUniversity of Pune HistoryThe University of Pune was established under the Poona University Act, passed by the Bombay legislature on February 10, 1948. In the same year, Dr. M.R. Jayakar assumed office as the first vice chancellor of the university. Shri B.G. .