Succession politics and China's future.

Succession politics and China's future. At some point during the 1995 calendar year, what had been a truismin Chinese politics from 1978 on became inaccurate: Deng Xiaoping Deng Xiaopingor Teng Hsiao-p'ing(both: dŭng` shou`pĭng`), 1904–97, Chinese revolutionary and government leader, b. Sichuan prov. was nolonger the most powerful political actor in China. He was thought tohave been near death in the spring, and though he has recovered enoughto walk a little bit, he can no longer make his thoughts understood toothers.(1) In a sense, succession to Deng Xiaoping, China'spreeminent leader from 1978 to 1995, is already underway.But if Deng is no longer the most powerful political figure in Chinatoday, it is not clear who is. Jiang Zemin holds most of the toppositions in China and is the designated successor. But no designatedsuccessor has ever consolidated power in the People's Republic ofChina, and few have survived politically once the preeminent leaderfinally passes from the scene. The octogenarian oc��to��ge��nar��i��anadj.Being between 80 and 90 years of age.n.A person between 80 and 90 years of age. Yang Shangkun is seen asthe kingmaker king��mak��er?n.One who has the political power to influence the selection of a candidate for high public office.king after Deng dies, but his relations with Jiang Zemin areless than clear. The head of the public security system, Qiao Shi Qiao Shi (Chinese: 乔石; Pinyin: Qi��o Sh��; Wade-Giles: Ch'iao Shih; born December 1924) is a politician in the People's Republic of China. , isalso seen as a strong contender, if only because it is hard to seeanyone else who is institutionally powerful enough to challenge Jiang.The fact that no outside observers can say conclusively who is the mostimportant leader says something very significant about China'spolitical system. A case could be made for several figures, but as yetnone have stepped to the fore. It seems to many observers that theChinese political system is on autopilot, and those who seek to becomethe preeminent leader are waiting for Deng's physical demise beforeseeking power.(2)Many in the West believe it matters profoundly who succeeds DengXiaoping. Others believe that whoever follows as top leader will not becapable of mobilizing the kind of political clout that Deng has. Somepeople in both camps, and still others holding more diverse views onsuccession and Chinese politics, believe that Deng's death will bethe start of a Chinese collapse, analogous the fall of the Soviet Union.Recent issues of Foreign Affairs foreign affairspl.n.Affairs concerning international relations and national interests in foreign countries. and Foreign Policy, carrying essayswith such titles as After Deng the Deluge" and "Why ChinaWill Collapse," are only two recent examples of the range ofmaterial on China that has appeared since 1989 which suggests that thecurrent system can not continue.(3) Yet, while many observers see theprospects for gross political instability in China growing or at leastbecoming the dominant trend, others point to the rise of Chinaeconomically, expounding the hope that prosperity will likely lead to apeaceful democratic transition some time in the future. Still others seea rising China as a threat to international, Asian and U.S. security.(4)It is all but certain that communism in China will evolve and becomean even less effective ideology than it already is. Given that mostother communist states are now formerly communist, it is likely thatcommunism will not survive in China either. But the inevitability ofcollapse, whether that collapse is of the communist political system ornational disintegration, may have little or nothing to do withsuccession politics. This paper will argue that most observers misread mis��read?tr.v. mis��read , mis��read��ing, mis��reads1. To read inaccurately.2. To misinterpret or misunderstand: misread our friendly concern as prying. China; they do not recognize some of the major changes that have takenplace within that society since the onset of reform, if they see adominant or powerful leader as an inevitable outcome of China'ssuccession process. A dominant leader may be a necessary condition forChinese stability and prosperity, but the emergence of such a figure isnot inevitable and, indeed, not likely. The real questions this paperseeks to address are why and how succession matters and why in a numberof cases it does not. To state an extreme, though I think accurate, viewof what succession might mean in China compared to the United States United States,officially United States of America, republic (2005 est. pop. 295,734,000), 3,539,227 sq mi (9,166,598 sq km), North America. The United States is the world's third largest country in population and the fourth largest country in area. , itis likely that if a Republican were elected president in 1996, and theRepublican Party retained a majority in both houses of Congress, thatpresident could do more to change the United States than any potentialsuccessor could to change China's direction.In the West, many people see China, and authoritarian politicalsystems more generally, as leader- or individual-dominated systems. As aresult, they see the question of who assumes power as critical. Theassumption is that in obtaining power, authoritarian leaders will beable to exercise power in uncontrolled or unconstrained ways. In thiscontext, many observers note that China is a system governed byindividuals, not institutions, or in Chinese, a system of renzhi, notfazhi.(5) But authoritarian leadership is not necessarily absolute.Leaders can be strong or weak, more or less constrained by the overalllegitimacy of the political system they head, constrained by theresources available to the government or by the clout of keyorganizations and constituencies within the political system.Why Succession MattersMost nondemocratic political systems do not have fullyinstitutionalized systems of succession. This means that the death oroverthrow of the nation's top leader throws the question of whorules into potentially explosive contestation. Different politicalsystems have various methods of coping with this potential uncertainty.Some, like the Vatican Council Vatican Counciln.Either of two ecumenical councils of the Roman Catholic Church, the First Vatican Council (1869-1870) and the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), convoked by Pius IX and John XXIII, respectively. of Cardinals choosing the next pope,elect successors. Designated hereditary patterns of succession areanother method to try to ensure stability and authority for thesuccessor. These mechanisms and others do not negate politics, butinstead channel or restrain the influence of politics. In the Vaticancase, a great deal of politicking goes on prior to the death of theincumbent pope, particularly if the pontiff gradually declines and dies,as opposed to death from sudden illness which often leaves a short-termpower vacuum A power vacuum is an expression for a political situation that can occur when a government has no identifiable central authority. The metaphor implies that, like a physical vacuum, other forces will tend to "rush in" to fill the vacuum as soon as it is created, perhaps in the form . On the other hand, with hereditary patterns of succession,those disadvantaged by the established pattern have been know toassassinate or otherwise force the heir apparent heir apparentn. the person who is expected to receive a share of the estate of a family member if he/she lives longer, or is not specifically disinherited by will. (See: heir) from power. A greatadvantage of democratic, compared to non-democratic, systems is thatthey confine the area of political contestation and render the processof succession and transition less dangerous to the health of the polity.The line of succession Noun 1. line of succession - the order in which individuals are expected to succeed one another in some official positionline - a formation of people or things one behind another; "the line stretched clear around the corner"; "you must wait in a long line at the is set in law or the constitution, and even ifthe leader dies, constitutional principles govern who succeeds. Politicshardly disappear in the process of determining the succession, butcertain means and outcomes are made illegitimate in consolidateddemocratic systems.With China, outside observers, and presumably pre��sum��a��ble?adj.That can be presumed or taken for granted; reasonable as a supposition: presumable causes of the disaster. many Chinese politicalinsiders, do not know how succession is determined. There has only beenone succession in the history of the People's Republic of China The history of the People's Republic of China details the history of mainland China since October 1, 1949, when, after a near complete victory by the Communist Party of China (CPC) in the Chinese Civil War, Mao Zedong proclaimed the People's Republic of China (PRC) from atop ,that is, Deng's eventual assumption of power following MaoZedong's death. A number of succession arrangements have been made,and certain understandings and norms are part of the system of rule.Yet, no succession arrangement to date has ever gone completely asplanned, and most have failed disastrously, particularly from the pointof view of the putative successors. Two potential successors died as aresult of conflict with the top leader: Liu Shaoqi Liu Shaoqior Liu Shao-ch'i(both: ly shou-chē), 1898?–1969, Chinese Communist political leader. , widely conceded tobe the number two person in the Chinese Communist Party Chinese Communist party:see Communist party, in China. Chinese Communist Party (CCP)Political party founded in China in 1921 by Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Mao Zedong, and others. and Mao'slikely successor, but died due to lack of medical attention in 1969after being removed from power, during the early stages of the CulturalRevolution; and Lin Biao Lin Biaoor Lin Piao(both: lĭn byou), 1908–71, Chinese Communist general and political leader. Lin was trained at Whampoa Academy, and during the Northern Expedition he rose to company commander in the Kuomintang army. , commander of the military and theconstitutionally designated successor to Mao, who failed in a planecrash while trying to flee China after a supposed failed assassination AssassinationSee also Murder.assassinsFanatical Moslem sect that smoked hashish and murdered Crusaders (11th—12th centuries). [Islamic Hist.: Brewer Note-Book, 52]Brutusconspirator and assassin of Julius Caesar. [Br. attempt on Mao in 1971. In 1976, Hua Guofeng Hua Guofengor Hua Kuo-feng(both: hwä gwôfŭng), 1920–, Chinese Communist leader. He was minister of public security and deputy premier in 1975. appeared to succeed inassuming the top leadership position after Mao, but was outmaneuveredand forced from power by Deng Xiaoping by late 1978 after failing toconsolidate power. Prior to Mao's death in September 1976, Hua waselevated to the premiership and the ranking Party vice-chairman. Hislegitimacy as successor was linked to Mao's support in the lastyear ormao's life, The policies of the final ten years ofMao's reign were detrimental to so many people that Hua's tieto Mao was a source of great vulnerability, as well as his mandate forsuccession. Two others were removed from the line of succession by Dengin the 1980s after holding the post of party general-secretary, formallythe most important political position in China, though their subsequentfalls from grace were not total. Hu Yaobang's removal in 1987 wasmore like Hua Guofeng's, with Hu losing out but not being subjectto much political attack. The fall of Hu's replacement asgeneral-secretary, Zhao Ziyang Zhao Ziyangor Chao Tzu-yang(both: zhou zēyäng), 1919–2005, Chinese Communist leader. Active as a local party leader during World War II, by the 1960s he was party secretary of Guangdong prov. , was accompanied in 1989 by widespreadvilification of Zhao and his policies in the wake of the Tiananmendemonstrations. Such a record among hopefuls to the top leadershipposition should give pause to the current designated successor, JiangZemin.In terms of norms and procedures, the democratic centralism Democratic centralism is the name given to the principles of internal organization used by Leninist political parties, and the term is sometimes used as a synonym for any Leninist policy inside a political party. of theChinese Communist Party suggests that the decision of who the successorwill be is likely to be made by the very top leadership, namely theParty politburo, plus a number of aged leaders, and ratified bylower-ranking, though still elite, convocations, such as a plenarysession Plenary session is a term often used in s to define the part of the conference when all members of all parties are in attendance.These sessions may contain a broad range of content from Keynotes to Panel Discussions and are not necessarily related to a specific style of delivery. of the Party's Central Committee. The view of the ChineseCommunist Party that the "Party must command the gun"suclyests that the military should not have a direct say in thesuccession, though the army's leaders, as top Party officials,would perhaps parricipate in the succession process.(6) Whether the twonorms -- democratic centralism and Party control of the military -- willbe followed in the coming succession remains unknown. Arguments can bemade either way. The view that they will not hold depends on the logicthat power is everything and that contenders or involved parties will doall they can to win or influence the succession.(7) The other argumentsees these norms prevailing, since all top leaders realize that theChinese Communist Party's hold on power is relatively tenuous andthat elites must make key decisions, or risk mass politicaluprisings.(8)As suggested above, the process of succession in China is really twodifferent processes: succession, the process by which one comes to holdthe top position(s) in the political system after the incumbentleader's death; and consolidation, the ability of the successor toacquire authority within the political system so that he can replacerivals, secure his own power, articulate a more or less coherentjustification for his rule and put forth what the Chinese call a"general line" that addresses major societal needs in arelatively effective way.(9)It is likely that Jiang Zemin will be the successor, though hisability to consolidate his position is far from clear, if not totallyunlikely While Jiang holds the formal positions that would seem toguarantee that he will become the successor, there is little in hispersonality or exercise of power to date that indicates he has thecombination of vision, political skill and ruthlessness that would allowhim to consolidate power and make him more than the top ranking leaderin a constellation of basically equally powerful and largely colorlessfigures.Obviously, one reason succession matters in China is that both whorules and who has supreme power become open questions. Uncertainty aboutpolitical power and leadership prevails. For countries with nuclearweapons, such uncertainty is particularly dangerous. China specialistsknow little about the command and control procedures for China'snuclear weapons systems. Presumably, the chairman of the MilitaryAffairs Commission of the Communist Party Communist party, in ChinaCommunist party,in China, ruling party of the world's most populous nation since 1949 and most important Communist party in the world since the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. has control over the arsenal,which is a position currently held by Jiang Zemin. But if a powerstruggle were to break out, who actually exercised control overChina's nuclear weapons could be quickly called into question.The successor -- whoever it is and however he (all contenders beingmale) comes to power -- matters also for the following reasons. Morethan any other individual, the top leader with authority, in mostpolitical systems, sets the tone for the state in its external relationsand also in the way the regime governs internally In explicitlyideological systems, the top leader also has the last say on ideologicalquestions. His ability to manipulate the existing corpus of symbolic andideological systems is often a key source of power. However, successionalso matters in terms of how the change in leadership comes about. Isthe arrangement of a quid pro quo [Latin, What for what or Something for something.] The mutual consideration that passes between two parties to a contractual agreement, thereby rendering the agreement valid and binding. necessary to the succession process?Are certain policy options favored or eliminated, or certain-individualsremoved from power as part of the process of succession? Do fiercestruggles for power or deadlock encourage contenders for power to expandthe arenas of political mobilization, allowing lower-level officials oreven the people to participate in the process? All of these questionsreflect the inherent uncertainty succession brings to the politicalsystem when the means of succession are not institutionalized. Theysuggest that any and all means, and all relevant actors may influenceoutcomes of succession if succession is a protracted, highly conflictualprocess. This does not mean they necessarily will effect the outcome,but in the realm of the struggle for power anything is possible, and theunintended consequences of succession processes can fundamentally changepolitical systems. For example, the death of the reform-minded HuYaobang Hu Yaobang(h` you`bäng`), 1915–89, Chinese Communist political leader, b. Hunan prov. in April 1989 and the perception of many intellectuals that aconservative backlash against reform was imminent, could with widespreadpopular dissatisfaction with the regime, precipated the democracymovement of 1989. Uncontrolled struggles for power might open up asimilar ability for urban society to take to the streets in support ofone candidate, or in opposition to the entire regime. Since, as noted,there has been only one true succession in the history of thePeople's Republic of China, it is hard to give concrete examplesfrom history of what might happen during the forthcoming succession.Succession and consolidation of power provide the opportunity for afundamental rethinking of policy directions, the "generalline," of the state. Again, this noes not mean that new policydirections will necessarily follow, but succession processes open up awider window of opportunity for policy and directional changes than anyother occasion.(10) Clearly, Deng Xiaoping's ability to supplantHua Guofeng in the 1977 to 1978 period was in part caused by Deng'swillingness to push China in a number of new policy directions. Huamoved only modestly away from Maoist directions of development andpolitics, but he did move away, especially from those policies mostclosely associated with Mao in the last ten years of Mao's life.However, because the preferred method in China for trying to handle thesuccession issue is to make arrangements before the top leader dies, theputative successor is often closely linked with his sponsor. This mightwork if the loyal successor has independent standing with the party, aswas the case with Liu Shaoqi, Mao's presumed successor until, thatis, Mao had Liu removed from power in 1966 to 1967.When the potential successor has limited authority within theParty-state, the difficulties are considerable, and the new potentialleader faces what has been called the dilemma of the successor.(11) Onthe one hand, the potential successor must maintain the support of thetop leader; otherwise the top leader might withdraw his patronage, andthe potential successor could, at a minimum, be displaced from hisposition of privilege. This requires that the successor be loyal to thetop leader personally and to his policy commitments. Thus, before andafter Mao's death, Hua Guofeng spoke of the need to "continuethe revolution," meaning destructive policies of class struggle.But the potential successor lacks the types of political resourcesassociated with the top leader, and of course, the successor will nothave the top leader's support to fall back on when the top leaderdies or otherwise disappears from the political scene. In order to beable to govern after the death of the top leader, the potentialsuccessor must begin to cultivate his own independent bases of politicalsupport alongside the incumbent. Such activities may draw the suspicionof the top leader, leading the latter to conclude that the successor isdisloyal, causing the top leader to rethink his original decision aboutthe successor.If the successor is actually able to succeed, he must go aboutbuilding authority, through policy changes and other ways. In HuaGuofeng's case, perhaps by default, he was named successor so closeto his time of accession that Mao could not retract TO RETRACT. To withdraw a proposition or offer before it has been accepted. 2. This the party making it has a right to do is long as it has not been accepted; for no principle of law or equity can, under these circumstances, require him to persevere in it. his decision andremove him, though the Gang of Four, led by Mao's apparentlyestranged wife Jiang Qing, may have tried to do so. Similarly, JiangZemin may succeed simply due to Deng's waning health. However, itdoes not appear that Jiang is the type of leader who believes in majorchanges, nor are many of the fundamental policy issues in China todayconducive to easy, distinctive solutions with rapid pay-offs, thesebeing the kinds of policy results that would strengthen Jiang'spolitical position. Jiang's entire career is that of thebureaucrat-technocrat. He served in machine building factories, studiedin the Soviet Union, rose in the hierarchies or the ministries ofmachine building and the Ministry of Electronics, becoming minister inthe early 1980s, and then became head of the party in Shanghai in 1987,after serving as mayor. In 1989, he became the Party's generalsecretary It is hard to think of a distinctive policy or attribute toassociate with him except general colorlessness. It is the combinationof difficult policy problems, the relative success of many ofDeng's policies, the changes in China since 1978 and JiangZemin's personality that suggest that succession matters much lessnow than it did in China in the mid to late 1970s.Why Succession in China Today Does Not MatterIn a number of ways, China has changed fundamentally since Mao'sdeath. This is particularly true in the economy and the realm of privatelife, but even in politics and international relations international relations,study of the relations among states and other political and economic units in the international system. Particular areas of study within the field of international relations include diplomacy and diplomatic history, international law, . In addition tothe changes brought about by economic growth and the development of ofcapitalism in China, the legacy of the bloody suppression of theTiananmen demonstrations has the effect of constraining or limitingaspects of succession politics. The Party-state has little or nolegitimacy especially in urban areas and particularly in Beijing. MostChinese leaders at local and central levels, if not at the very top, arevery aware of the limited support they have from society. They can notrely on ideological or other forms of charisma to legitimize le��git��i��mize?tr.v. le��git��i��mized, le��git��i��miz��ing, le��git��i��miz��esTo legitimate.le��git theParty-state, with the partial exception of official nationalism, nordoes traditional or rational-legal authority provide much legitimacy forthe regime. To the extent the regime has any legitimacy, that legitimacyis based on performance, particularly in terms of maintaining high ratesof economic growth. This, in turn, requires the preservation of thecurrent policy environment for the economy. This affects not just thedomestic environment, but also limits China's activities vis-a-visHong Hong and Taiwan, since they are the major sources of foreigninvestment in China. In short, the regime's lack of legitimacymakes it highly unlikely that it can return the Chinese economy to amore traditional socialist path. Centralized planning and stateownership of most economic activity would be physically impossible andwould generate widespread opposition. Even if successfully undertaken,tighter central control would delay China's modernization and raceto develop on par with more advanced economies.But the survival of the regime is not only dependent on continuedeconomic growth. It is also quite clear that the power of the centralgovernment in China to project a unified front to the rest of thepolitical system has declined. Some of this decline is a direct outcomeof the success of economic reforms. The fundamental movement away fromthe planned, physical allocation of goods in the economy to marketdecentralization de��cen��tral��ize?v. de��cen��tral��ized, de��cen��tral��iz��ing, de��cen��tral��iz��esv.tr.1. To distribute the administrative functions or powers of (a central authority) among several local authorities. greatly changes the nature of the center'srole.(12) The impact of interest rate changes, for example, are verydifferent than was the case when the center might allocate or withholdallocation of goods required for production. The center's authoritybecomes somewhat less arbitrary or maybe less powerful; in theory, italso is more efficient in the sense that market mechanisms would play abroader role in economic allocation than would the more fallible fal��li��ble?adj.1. Capable of making an error: Humans are only fallible.2. Tending or likely to be erroneous: fallible hypotheses. choicesof politicians. It also takes less effort to conform to Verb 1. conform to - satisfy a condition or restriction; "Does this paper meet the requirements for the degree?"fit, meetcoordinate - be co-ordinated; "These activities coordinate well" market-basedsignals than to impose the preferences of central planners.Decentralization and special policies for regions and provinces werefundamental components of Deng's reform policies. They lead tomassive growth in industrial output and exports. To an indeterminatedegree, these successes have heightened provincial ability to resistsome central directives, if not allow provinces to run themselves onincreasingly autonomous lines.(13) As long as these areas with very higheconomic growth rates Growth RatesThe compounded annualized rate of growth of a company's revenues, earnings, dividends, or other figures.Notes:Remember, historically high growth rates don't always mean a high rate of growth looking into the future. continue to grow, their relative freedom of actionis likely to remain unchallenged by the center. The longer this relativefreedom of action exists, the harder it will be to circumscribe cir��cum��scribe?tr.v. cir��cum��scribed, cir��cum��scrib��ing, cir��cum��scribes1. To draw a line around; encircle.2. To limit narrowly; restrict.3. To determine the limits of; define. itlater. In short, certain sets of governmental relationships arerelatively stable and increasingly institutionalized. The clout ofcertain regions and provinces is so great that central leaders can onlytry to reverse the decentralization of these regions at their peril.Re-centralization would undoubtedly require coercion. It would causegrowth to slow and have profound effects on policies toward Hong Kong Hong Kong(hŏng kŏng), Mandarin Xianggang, special administrative region of China, formerly a British crown colony (2005 est. pop. 6,899,000), land area 422 sq mi (1,092 sq km), adjacent to Guangdong prov. and Taiwan, because of alliances between overseas Chinese A list of famous people with Chinese ancestry living outside of the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. Leaders and politiciansAsiaSteve Chia, politician, Singapore 谢镜? entrepreneursand local officials in the most decentralized regions of China.What is true of regional administration is also true of some of themajor bureaucracies and interests in Chinese politics and economics,particularly the military From the successor's point of view, themilitary may be the most important organization in China. While theParty is in theory supposed to command the gun, with command and controlprocedures existing to make local military commanders subject to centralmilitary and political control, the People's Liberation Army People's Liberation ArmyUnified organization of China's land, sea, and air forces. It is one of the largest military forces in the world. The People's Liberation Army traces its roots to the 1927 Nanchang Uprising of the communists against the Nationalists. hasthe potential to use its military power for or against the successor andthe regime. Obviously, in the final analysis, it is the People'sLiberation Army and its subordinate organization, the People'sArmed Police The People's Armed Police Force (Abbreviation: PAP; Simplified Chinese: 人民武装警察部队; pinyin: Renmin wuzhuang jingcha budui , which keeps the party in power, as demonstrated on 4 June1989.(14) As a last resort, China's leaders must do what they canto ensure that the forces of organized coercion are willing to obeyorders to suppress potential internal enemies.The People's Liberation Army's control over military forcealso poses the threat of the military or units within the militaryplaying the decisive role in determining the successor. All candidatesfor succession are aware that in 1976, a combination of military,security and civilian leaders combined and mobilized forces to arrestthe Gang of Four and end their effective political role.(15) While thehistory of successful coups in all current and former communist statesis very limited in number, the possibility of a coup can not be totallydiscounted. One way to avert the possibility of a coup is for contendersto bid for military support, by promises of increased defense spending,procurement of more capable weapons systems, either domestically or fromabroad, and enhanced operational and professional autonomy professional autonomy,n the right and privilege provided by a governmental entity to a class of professionals, and to each qualified licensed caregiver within that profession, to provide services independent of supervision. for themilitary within the basic, or minimal, parameter of party control. Infact, increased defense spending, more high-tech weapons and growingautonomy have been clearly visible since 1989.(16) Given the obsoletenature of the vast majority of the army's weapons systems andChina's claims to Taiwan and the South China Seas, there are otherreasons for the increase in resources devoted to the military, butcertainly succession politics is at work here as well. At the veryleast, the People's Liberation Army can sit back and allow thepoliticians to compete for its support or at least its neutrality.Another way in which the army's backing matters is the fact thatthe People's Liberation Army, similar to most militaryestablishments worldwide, is one of the major supporters of, andcontributors to, official nationalism. The military and its leaders arethus poised to intervene in politics and especially in succession ifthey feel that the political leadership is betraying the officiallysanctioned version of nationalism. It appears that China's hardlinestance on the Taiwan issue since Taiwan's president Lee Tenghuivisited the United States in an unofficial capacity in June 1995, isdirectly related to complaints by the military that Jiang Zemin and QianQichen, China's foreign minister, did not act forcefully enough toprevent Lee's trip. In turn, this reinforces a very rigid positionby the People's Republic of China on its disputed territorialclaims and issues related to Chinese sovereignty.While the military and, to a much lesser extent, domestic police andsecurity organizations have unique attributes that give them greatleverage in the political system, the ability of units of all types tolobby for preferred policy options, to evade policies they findinhospitable to their activities and otherwise act on their interestshas greatly increased since Mao's death in 1976. Much of this, infact, is the result of the passing of Mao. The system is no longersharply polarized by ideology. Pursuit of individual and organizationalinterests are no longer defined as prima facie evidence prima facie evidencen. LawEvidence that would, if uncontested, establish a fact or raise a presumption of a fact. of selfishbehavior, and thus labeled capitalist and anathematized, withpotentially severe political consequences. Broad purges associated withMaoist rule from the late 1950s onward have all disappeared within theParty-state system. The post-Tiananmen Square "Partyrectification" indeed removed a significant number of officialsfrom power, at least temporarily. But the logic of the choice of targetswas discernible, and with a few exceptions, removal from power did notseem to be based on personal connections, as opposed to actualbehaviors. But purge or its threat has not been a major tool oforganizational or bureaucratic control in the Deng period.Finally, Chinese society as a whole is much more complex now thanwhen Mao was alive. There is much greater physical mobility throughoutChina. Moving to a potentially more hospitable environment is now anoption, one that did not exist from about 1960 to the early 1980s.Alternate modes of employment, housing, access to health care have alldeveloped over the last decade. These come with costs, but many Chinesecitizens are much less dependent on the state system and the stateeconomy than they once were. In most cases, the state finds it moredifficult to exert direct control over its people, with the notableexception of family planning family planningUse of measures designed to regulate the number and spacing of children within a family, largely to curb population growth and ensure each family’s access to limited resources. , which is at least as totalitarian as anyof Mao's policies.But this general loss of the ability to control people as extensivelyas before is coupled with the weakening of ideological and other meansof trying to extend hegemony over the population in the realm of cultureand ideas. The agents of socialization socialization/so��cial��iza��tion/ (so?shal-i-za��shun) the process by which society integrates the individual and the individual learns to behave in socially acceptable ways. so��cial��i��za��tionn. -- schools, the family and others-- are much less effective in conveying the party's message aboutits right to rule. To be sure, propaganda continues, but its effects arelimited. Alternative sources of information, new leisure opportunities,prosperity for some, smaller family size and the lavish attention paidby urban parents to their single child, in addition to new conspicuouslevels of consumption, all limit if not undermine the claims which theregime makes on the people of China. In short, the regime weighs lessheavily on its people than before. It would take extraordinary amountsof coercion to revert to more extensive control over individuals. Suchcoercion would likely undermine all important economic growth levels andwould remove the last limited prop for regime legitimacy. This limitedstrength of the regime constrains what leaders can do and makes theissue of who succeeds less important than in early years of communistparty rule.For the People's Republic of China, Mao was the unique ruler. Hehad charismatic authority and ideological vision. The party system waslargely unified and believed in itself and its mission under Mao.Consequently, attempts were made to institute elements of Mao'svision in the years he was alive. Many of these attempts, however, ledto great disaster, disillusionment DisillusionmentAdams, Nickloses innocence through WWI experience. [Am. Lit.: “The Killers”]Angry Young Mendisillusioned postwar writers of Britain, such as Osborne and Amis. [Br. Lit. within the population and the Partyand subsequently the creation of widespread factionalism within theParty. As a result of Mao's death, charisma and ideology playeddeclining roles in Chinese politics. China moved from totalitarianismwith all the power for the leader that this implies to a more commonform of hard authoritarianism, where the ruler must bargain with otherpowerful forces within the political system. Deng had significantpolitical resources, experience and prestige. With his passing, it islikely that his successors will be even more ordinary, non-democraticrulers.(17)The nature of the issues confronting the regime and its leadershipare also not amenable to the types of quick, easy and positive resultsthat would encourage policy innovation, in turn contributing to thecreation of authority for the successor. The ever-present issues on theagenda include how to reform state-owned industrial enterprises, how todeal with inflation, how to limit and control corruption, how to respondto growing inequalities, how to control the population, both in terms ofsocial order and the rate of natural increase, and how to overcomepopular resentment toward the regime and its leaders. All of theseissues are complex, involve trade-offs, often making many people worseoff in the short run than before the advantages of the policies havebegun in the longer term, and may in fact not be fully susceptible togovernment social engineering. These difficulties are ultimatelycompounded by the government's lack of authority andself-confidence.Several brief examples illustrate these points. In recent years, andbriefly during the summer of 1995, Chinese leaders with clearencouragement from Deng Xiaoping have tried to move forward on housingreform, basically trying to privatize government-owned and stateenterprise-owned apartments. Prior to reform, these apartments wereheavily subsidized, and rents were typically under five percent of totalhousehold income. Low rents failed to pay for simple maintenance, and ofcourse never came close to amortizing the cost of construction. Fornarrow financial reasons, the state wanted to shed this burden. Butthere is an additional powerful reason for housing reform as well. Therecan not be true economic reform until there is a real labor market labor marketA place where labor is exchanged for wages; an LM is defined by geography, education and technical expertise, occupation, licensure or certification requirements, and job experience , andthere can be no real labor market unless people can obtain housing onthe open market. The development of a private housing market is thus aprecondition for a true factor market for labor. The problem, of course,is that privatizing housing means sharply higher prices for residents,in an already inflationary situation. Those who have benefited fromsubsidized housing protested, staged sit-ins and otherwise madeimplementation of the reform difficult. Moreover, at virtually the firstsign of social unrest, the local government units responsible forimplementing these changes quickly retreated and halted the reform forfear of social disorder and outright opposition.(18)The singular issue of housing reform is dwarfed by the problems ofstate-owned industrial enterprises. The roughly 100,000 state-ownedenterprises were the heart of the planned economy, with approximately10,000 large and medium state enterprises still critical to the outputof many commodities and still a significant portion of governmentrevenues. A large fraction of theseenterprises are in the red -- officially about 30 percent, unofficialestimates as high as 60 percent. Many are kept alive by loans from thebanking system, which only contribute to the system's financialwoes, with over half of all loans from state banks thought to beeffectively non-performing. State-owned enterprises are alsocharacterized by gross overstaffing, functioning as welfare and socialorganizations, as much as employers and production units. Reform, inother words Adv. 1. in other words - otherwise stated; "in other words, we are broke"put differently , aims to emphasize the economic aspects of enterprises anddownplay, if not eliminate, their social functions.The state has repeatedly broached the issue of state-enterprisereform, and every time it seems ready to get serious, it retreats in theface of opposition or anticipated opposition. To be sure, there iscreeping reform in the system, with the occasional state-ownedenterprise going bankrupt, but a fundamental change in the condition ofstate enterprises has not occurred and will not likely occur untilmillions of redundant workers are fired or laid off and many enterprisesclose. The implications of this for social order are negative andenormous with the regime becoming particularly sensitive to incipientsigns of labor activism. Chinese, perhaps even more than other peoples,equate political regimes with the leaders running the country Thus, badpolicy implies bad people in charge, and Chinese political tradition hasalways had some room within it for opposing bad rulers. Moreover,whatever vestigial ves��tig��i��aladj.Occurring or persisting as a rudimentary or degenerate structure. claims socialist ideology has in China are linkedwith the job security associated with state industry What does this sayabout the system if state-owned enterprises in large numbers literallygo bankrupt?Thus, on many policy issues, the regime and its leaders appear lockedin a vicious circle A Vicious Circle (1996) is a novel by Amanda Craig which dissects and satirizes contemporary British society. In particular, it describes the world of publishing -- its aspiring young authors, busy agents and opportunist literary critics. . The party is unwilling or unable to move forwardwith reforms because of their complexities, interconnections and mostespecially because of the opposition they would engender. Yet, pushingthrough these further reforms would be a minimum step necessary toenhance the legitimacy of the state and improve its ability to guidedevelopment. In short, the policy issues faced by the leadership and theregime are so complex and threaten so much societal opposition that theyare not likely to be resolved by some sort of dramatic policyinitiative.Finally, the personalities of the likely candidates for succession,with the two leading candidates being Jiang Zemin, the putativesuccessor, and Qiad Shi, a shadowy figure with ties to internal securityaffairs, do not give much indiction INDICTION, computation of time. An indiction contained a space of fifteen years. 2. It was used in dating at Rome and in England. It began at the dismission of the Nicene council, A. D. 312. of the chance of any major newinitiatives after Deng Xiaoping's death. Neither Jiang nor Qiao,nor any other top leader, has a major following among lower-levelleaders and society at large. A number of them, especially Premier LiPeng, are positively detested. Few have demonstrated any politicalimagination, willingness to take risks or any ambition to takeindividual responsibility. From both within China and from abroad, it isimpossible to read the men who wish to be Deng Xiaoping's successorand/or China's next paramount leader. Few indeed have any sense ofwho among these people has the burning desire, ruthlessness and cunningit takes to rise to the very top. Maybe they themselves do not know.Because the potential successors seem so dwarfed by the generation ofleaders that preceded them, it is hard to believe that even if any ofthese figures became the paramount leader the basic direction of centralpolicy would be very different. In sum, I believe Jiang Zemin willlikely be the successor, but not the paramount leader in the way Dengis. China will be led by a collective leadership, which is fundamentallyconservative in its policy directions. Bargaining, negotiation, leastcommon denominator least common denominatorn. Abbr. lcdThe least common multiple of the denominators of a set of fractions: The least common denominator of 1/3 and 1/4 is 12. approaches to policy issues and other types ofbureaucratic politics will be the dominant forms of intra-leadershippolitics in post-Deng China. However, since the history of Chinesegovernance is not replete with examples of prolonged and stablecollective leadership, the stability of such a form of leadership cannot be taken for granted Adj. 1. taken for granted - evident without proof or argument; "an axiomatic truth"; "we hold these truths to be self-evident"axiomatic, self-evidentobvious - easily perceived by the senses or grasped by the mind; "obvious errors" . Since there are almost no precedents forcollective leadership, it is hard to make projections into the future.Any successor faces profound constraints on his freedom of action; hemust maintain high rates of growth in the short term, even at theexpense of long-term economic stability, with growth typically moreimportant that systematic attempts to control inflation. This does notmean increased state intervention in the economy. On the contrary, itmeans basically leaving the economic system alone. He must, however,appease the military He will maintain a heavy hand toward politicalopposition, partly out of regime weakness. The legitimacy of the regimeis so limited and the Chinese Communist Party so corrupt that anylifting of the lid on dissent could quickly snowball into widespreadsocietal opposition, threatening the leadership and the Party. Moreover,it is not clear that even if the leader wanted to push politicalreforms, his colleagues would let him or that the system would implementthe reforms. He will lack the clout it takes to make really hard choicesand make them stick. The leader will be in no position to makefundamental changes in the official nationalist position of the Chinesestate. Taiwan and Tibet, from Beijing's perspective, remain partsof China. The South China Sea is essentially Chinese territorial waters territorial waters:see waters, territorial. territorial watersWaters under the sovereign jurisdiction of a nation or state, including both marginal sea and inland waters. .Thus, unlike the succession struggle after Mao Zedong's death,there will likely be much less policy change after Deng Xiaoping'sdeath for the reasons discussed above. In short, the current policies ofthe central Chinese state will basically continue in the near term, forapproximately the next three to five years. Whoever China's newleader is, he will have to retain power through adroit and repeatedpolitical deal making. He is more a hostage of key regime interests thanhe is capable of enacting a vision for China's future. In short, heis likely to be a broker.As I hope this essay shows, it is doubtful succession to DengXiaoping will mark a fundamental shift in Chinese politics or policy.The interests associated with the present distribution of power aresufficiently strong to prevent an individual emerging who will challengethe system and accelerate its transformation. Except to a few observers,history is not the result of deterministic law or rules. Human choicematters profoundly, and social science has always had a great deal ofdifficulty relating the individual actions and roles of leaders withbroader social processes. It is easy to say that the leader representsor is a product of certain social forces. It is much more difficult torelate innovation and basic changes initiated by individuals to theworkings of macro-societal processes.Yet, two recent examples suggest how, in a reform context and aChinese cultural context, we can not ignore the hidden potential ofindividuals to rise to the fore and fundamentally alter the pattern ofsocial change. The first is the case of Mikhail Gorbachev in the SovietUnion. The Soviet Union faced the pressing need for a variety ofreforms, but seemed to many observers to be incapable of change. Manysee China in a similar position today. Gorbachev emerged out of theSoviet agricultural sector, not an area of success, to put it mildly Hewas not well known outside of elite circles and was not thought to havemuch clout within the Party-state. Nonetheless, Gorbachev'sinitiatives allowed for social forces and processes to be rearranged,with the result being the collapse of the Soviet state. This wascertainly not Gorbachev's intention; quite the contrary, he wantedto bolster Soviet power. Yet, this seemingly non-distinctive apparatchik ap��pa��ra��tchik?n. pl. ap��pa��ra��tchiks or ap��pa��ra��tchi��ki1. A member of a Communist apparat.2. An unquestioningly loyal subordinate, especially of a political leader or organization. profoundly altered the course of history.The second example is perhaps even more relevant to China. In 1984,Chiang Ching-kuo, president of the Republic of China (Taiwan) made LeeTeng-hui his vice president. Lee was seen as a figurehead, a native-bornTaiwanese who could legitimize the Chinese Nationalist or Kuomintangparty to the majority Taiwanese population. Real power would be in thehands of the Kuomintang secretary general, Lee Huan, and in the militaryheaded by Hau Pei-tsun. Lee Teng-hui was a colorless technocrat tech��no��crat?n.1. An adherent or a proponent of technocracy.2. A technical expert, especially one in a managerial or administrative position. with noreal political base in the Kuomintang or society at large. Yet, sinceChiang's death in 1988 and Lee's succession, Lee hasoutmaneuvered all of his rivals, pushed Taiwan's democratization de��moc��ra��tize?tr.v. de��moc��ra��tized, de��moc��ra��tiz��ing, de��moc��ra��tiz��esTo make democratic.de��moc and is likely to be the first democratically elected president in anyChinese society when Taiwan goes to the polls in March 1996, despitehaving promised some of his rivals that he would only serve as aone-term president.(19) Lee has used democratization as his ticket topower. In the meantime Adv. 1. in the meantime - during the intervening time; "meanwhile I will not think about the problem"; "meantime he was attentive to his other interests"; "in the meantime the police were notified"meantime, meanwhile , he has also indirectly, though Beijing believeshe has directly, fanned the flames of Taiwan independence. Thus, fromhis prior experience, Taiwan observers had no real idea of what aneffective and powerful politician Lee appears to have become.These cautionary tales are simply guidelines. If or how potentialsuccessors will grow in office, or will reveal hidden strength and driveis impossible to know. None of the Bolshevik intellectuals expectedStalin to rise to the top. Simply because Jiang Zemin appearspolitically weak does not mean he is. Arguably, he has done more tostrengthen his position prior to actual succession than any otherdesignated successor. The closed nature of the political elite makesconfident forecasting of succession nearly impossible. In addition, wetend to assume that the system is in some sort of equilibrium, and thatthe basic status quo [Latin, The existing state of things at any given date.] Status quo ante bellum means the state of things before the war. The status quo to be preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. policy environment can be maintained into themedium term future. Given the tremendous changes that have taken placein China over the last sixteen or so years, it is heroic speculation tobelieve that some sort of stasis has been achieved and that the systemcan continue on its present path. This may, in fact, be the case;however, pollution, corruption, crime and alienation all continue toweigh heavily on policy options. Ecologically, China may not besustainable; politically, great resentments lie just below the surface.These underlying seismic forces of social change can be activated bypoor decisions by new leaders, by the new leaders failing to grapplewith to enter into contest with, resolutely and courageously.See also: Grapple these and other difficult issues, or by extraneous events thattrigger developments that can not be fully anticipated. One such eventmight be an invitation for Lee Teng-hui, after he has been directlyelected president of Taiwan to address a joint session of the U.S.Congress. By their nature, extraneous and exogenous developments areusually beyond our power to predict and are even harder to integrateinto our scenarios of China's future. Yet, it is precisely theappearance of sudden, major and unanticipated developments that oftenlinks the quality of leadership and underlying social processes,sometimes creating cascading failures for the regimes and other timesproviding the opportunity for policy breakthroughs. Maintenance of thestatus quo for three to five years after Deng Xiaoping's death isthe single most likely outcome in this observer's mind, but I wouldnot be terribly surprised to be wrong. (1) Benjamin Kang Lim,"China's Paramount Leader in Improving Health," Reuters,6 August 1995, electronically disseminated, reviews Deng's healthon the eve On the Eve (Накануне in Russian) is the third novel by famous Russian writer Ivan Turgenev, best known for his short stories and the novel Fathers and Sons. of his 91 st birthday. Rumors of Deng's impending demisewere provoked by his daughter, when in an interview with the The NewYork New York, state, United StatesNew York,Middle Atlantic state of the United States. It is bordered by Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and the Atlantic Ocean (E), New Jersey and Pennsylvania (S), Lakes Erie and Ontario and the Canadian province of Times' Beijing correspondent, she stated that herfather's health was deteriorating day-by-day. See Patrick Tyler,"Deng's Daughter Opens a Long Shut Door," The New YorkTimes, 13 January 1995. (2) See, for example, Jonathan Mirsky,"Peking Kingmakers Jostle for Leader's Faded Crown,"London Times, 22 August 1995, electronic edition. (3) Arthur Waldron,"After Deng the Deluge," Foreign Affairs, 74, no. 5(September-October 1995), pp. 148-153 and Jack A. Goldstone gold��stone?n.An aventurine with gold-colored inclusions.Noun 1. goldstone - aventurine spangled densely with fine gold-colored particles , "TheComing Chinese Collapse," Foreign Policy no. 99 (Summer 1995), pp.35-54, which made the case more from a social-demographic perspectivethan from a political one. (4) Some of the stronger statements of thecollapse or instability viewpoint are found in Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Chinaafter Deng Xiaoping (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1995) and W.J.F.Jenner, The Tyranny of History (London: Penguin Books, 1992). On themore optimistic side, see William Overholt, The Rise of China (New York:WW Norton, 1993). On the rise of China as a threat, see Nicholas D.Kristof Nicholas Donabet Kristof (born April 27 1959 in Yamhill, Oregon) is an American political scientist, author, and Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist specializing in East Asia. , "The Real China Threat," New York Times Magazine, 27August 1995, pp. 50-51. (5) Fazhi is an ambiguous term. It can betranslated as rule by law or rule of law. Rule of law is what we thinkof when we see democratic institutions making laws that the citizenrysee as binding and legitimate, because of the procedures followed intheir formulation. Rule by law can be understood to mean that the stateuses the law as a means of social control without reference to theprocess of its formulations. It can thus be harsh or strict, and impliesnothing about citizens rights or legitimacy. Rule by law has existedthroughout much of China's history and is reemerging in Chinatoday. Rule of law, however, has not been a part of China's legaland political history to any significant degree. See the discussion inBill Brugger and Stephen Reglar, Politics, Economics and Society inContemporary China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp.176-183. (6) Mao codified cod��i��fy?tr.v. cod��i��fied, cod��i��fy��ing, cod��i��fies1. To reduce to a code: codify laws.2. To arrange or systematize. the phrase "the Party must command thegun" in 1938, which has been a central principle in Party-militaryrelations since then. (7) An example is Tang Tsou, "ChinesePolitics at the Top: Factionalism or Informal Politics? Balance of Poweror a Game to Win All? The China Journal, no. 34 (July 1995), pp. 95-156.(8) I have made the argument about norms guiding succession in "TheLimits of Leadership in China," Asian Survey, 32, no. 11 (November1992), pp. 1046-62. (9) I develop this distinction and its implications,along with the process of transformation much more fully in my paper"Succession, Transition and Consolidation in China'sFuture," paper presented at the 24th Sino-American Conference onContemporary China, Washington, D.C., 15-17 June 1995. This codification The collection and systematic arrangement, usually by subject, of the laws of a state or country, or the statutory provisions, rules, and regulations that govern a specific area or subject of law or practice. of what consolidation means owes a debt to Sulan Whiting. (10) There wasa lively debate on this issue, particularly reflecting Sovietdevelopments. See Valerie Bunce n. 1. a sudden unexpected piece of good fortune.Noun 1. bunce - a sudden happening that brings good fortune (as a sudden opportunity to make money); "the demand for testing has created a boom for those unregulated laboratories where boxes of , Do New Leaders Make a Difference?(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 198 1); Myron Rush, HowCommunist States Change Their Leaders (Ithica: Cornell University Press,1974); and George W Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders(London: George Ajlen & Unwin, 1982). (11) Lowell Dittmer was thefirst person in the field of China studies to call attention to this.See his article "Bases of Power in Chinese Politics," WorldPolitics, 3 1, no. 1 (October 1978), pp. 26-60. See also his analysis ofsuccession arrangements before the leader's death and theimportance of new general lines for successors in his China Under Reform(Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), chapter 3. (12) There is great debateamong China specialists on just how much power the center has lostduring the course of the reforms. For a state of extreme centralweakness, see Jia Hao hao?n. pl. haoSee Table at currency.[Vietnamese h��o.]Noun 1. and Lin Zhimin, eds., Changing Central-LocalRelations in China (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). A more mixed pictureis found in David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal, eds., ChinaDeconstructs (London: Routledge, 1994). In the past, China hasdemonstrated the worst of what politicians' or planners'preferences can do, as evident in the Great Leap Forward Great Leap Forward,1957–60, Chinese economic plan aimed at revitalizing all sectors of the economy. Initiated by Mao Zedong, the plan emphasized decentralized, labor-intensive industrialization, typified by the construction of thousands of backyard steel of 1958 to1960, resulting in approximately 25 million deaths, or the Third Frontof defense industrialization industrializationProcess of converting to a socioeconomic order in which industry is dominant. The changes that took place in Britain during the Industrial Revolution of the late 18th and 19th century led the way for the early industrializing nations of western Europe and , which had enormous negative economiceffects, For the Great Leap Forward, see Roderick MacFarquhar, TheOrigins of the Cultural Revolution: Volume 2: The Great Leap Forward,1958-1960 (New York: Columbia University Press Columbia University Press is an academic press based in New York City and affiliated with Columbia University. It is currently directed by James D. Jordan (2004-present) and publishes titles in the humanities and sciences, including the fields of literary and cultural studies, , 1983). On the ThirdFront, see Barry Naughton, "The Third Front: DefenseIndustrialization in China's Interior," China Quarterly, no.115 (September 1988), pp. 351-386. (13) See Goodman and Segal, ibid.,which is perhaps the best of a spate of recent works oncentral-provincial relations. While most of the authors in thiscollection see greatly expanded roles for provincial-level units, nonereally sees demands for provincial independence. On relative autonomyand power for local officials, see Jean Oi, "Fiscal Reform and theEconomic foundations of Local State Corporatism corporatismTheory and practice of organizing the whole of society into corporate entities subordinate to the state. According to the theory, employers and employees would be organized into industrial and professional corporations serving as organs of political in China," WorldPolitics, 45, no. 1 (October 1992), pp. 99-126; and David Zweig,"Developmental Communities on China's Coast," ComparativePolitics, 27, no. 3 (April 1995), pp. 253-274. (14) This is not to saythat the Chinese Communist Party was in imminent danger of beingoverthrown in 1989, but that foundations of the regime. The bestexamination of the military's role in 1989 is Timothy Brook,Quelling the People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). (15) Thisis described from a different viewpoint in Fan Shuo, Ye Jianjing zai1976 (Ye Jianjing in 1976) (Beijing: Zhongyang Zhongyang DangxiaoChubanshe, 1990). See also Keith Forster, "China's Coup ofOctober 1976," Modern China, 18, no. 3 (July 1992), pp. 263-303.(16) Two studies that address these issues are Jonathan Pollack,"Structure and Change in the Chinese Military System," inKenneth Lieberthal and David M. Lampton David M. Lampton (born 1946) is a George and Sadie Hyman Professor of political science at Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He is Director of Chinese Studies at The Nixon Center and Director of China Studies at the SAIS. , eds., Bureaucracy, Politics andDecision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress "UC Press" redirects here, but this is also an abbreviation for University of Chicago PressUniversity of California Press, also known as UC Press, is a publishing house associated with the University of California that engages in academic publishing. , 1992), pp. 151-180; and Richard H. Yang et al., eds., ChineseRegionalism re��gion��al��ism?n.1. a. Political division of an area into partially autonomous regions.b. Advocacy of such a political system.2. Loyalty to the interests of a particular region.3. : The Security Dimension (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).(17) I argue this in more detail in "Limits on Leadership,"Asian Survey, 32, no. 11 (November 1992). (18) These developments wererecounted to me by a student who recently visited Zhengzhou, Henanprovince. (19) Lin Yao-fu, "The Road (Not) Taken: Taiwan under LeeTeng-hui," paper presented at the conference "Taiwan on theEve of the 21st Century," Seattle, WA, 6-8 September 1995.